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COMMENT
REGULATION OF WHITE HOUSE DEMONSTRATIONS
In A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel five political action organi-
zations challenged the constitutionality of regulations restricting demon-
strations at the White House.1 The challenged regulations required
prospective demonstrators to obtain a permit and prohibited gatherings
of more than 100 persons on the sidewalk fronting the White House
and 500 persons in Lafayette Park across the street from the Executive
Mansion.2 The National Park Service was given discretion to deny
a permit for any event with an expected size below the numerical limit
if the function "present[s] a clear and present danger to the public
health or safety" or "is of such nature or duration that it cannot
reasonably be accommodated in the particular area applied for." '
The district court granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction, enjoining the enforcement of the regulations.4 On appeal
by the government, the court of appeals affirmed but modified the
order to require fifteen days' notice of any demonstration.5 The
government then moved for summary judgment in the district court
and another appeal was lodged after the motion was granted.6 The
court of appeals reversed and reinstated the preliminary injunction as
modified, remanding with instructions "to proceed to trial on an ex-
pedited basis." 7 The government's motion for rehearing at the appel-
late level was denied, but the court authorized the implementation of
a questionnaire to obtain information about demonstrations in lieu of
a permit system." A specific questionnaire was adopted by the district
court; plaintiffs' request for reconsideration of the wording of the form
was denied.'
Litigation in this action is still taking place and the preliminary
injunction continues in force.' Although a great deal of litigation and
commentary have focused on the power of the state to regulate protest
1 Civil No. 688-69 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 19, 1969).
236 C.F.R. § 50.19 (1970). A permit was never required until promulgation of
the 100/500 limit in a memorandum from the Regional Director of the National
Capital Region of the National Park Service to the Chief of the U.S. Park Police,
dated Aug. 10, 1967.
336 C.F.R. § 50.19 (c) (2) (1970). During the pendency of the litigation the
government issued new regulations substantially the same. 35 Fed. Reg. 15393,
15394 (1970) (revised 36 C.F.R. §§50.19(f) (2), (3)).
4 37 U.S.L.W. 2610 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 1969).
5421 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
6429 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
7 Id. at 188.
8Id. at 193.
9 See 35 Fed. Reg. 6599-600 (1970).
10 See Civil No. 1210-71 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 19, 1971).
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demonstrations in other contexts,' A Quaker Action Group is unique
in its bearing on the symbolic significance of the White House as a
demonstration site and the related question of Presidential security.
This Comment will explore the constitutionality of restrictions regu-
lating demonstrations in the environs of the Executive Mansion.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE PRIOR RESTRAINTS
AND DEMONSTRATIONS
In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, the Supreme Court said:
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the
streets and parks for communication of views on national
questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not
absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination
to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance
with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of
regulation, be abridged or denied."
Regulation which operates by announcement of uniform rules
applicable to all demonstrations and which is enforced with prosecutions
commenced after the expression involves no unique constitutional diffi-
culties. Under such a regulatory system protected activity cannot
be anticipatorily suppressed, and constitutional defects in the substantive
rules may be raised as a defense in a judicial forum.' The interests
of government, however, frequently require administrative anticipation
and control of demonstrations. 4 The Supreme Court has recognized
this interest in dicta suggesting constitutional restraints upon the exer-
cise of administrative authority. For example:
It is, of course, undisputed that appropriate, limited dis-
cretion, under properly drawn statutes or ordinances, concern-
ing the time, place, duration or manner of use of the streets
for public assemblies may be vested in administrative officials,
provided that such limited discretion is "exercised with 'uni-
formity of method of treatment upon the facts of each applica-
tion, free from improper or inappropriate considerations and
from unfair discrimination' .... " 15
Limited discretion to adjust legitimate governmental interests with
first amendment freedoms may nevertheless threaten abridgment of
11 See notes 46-58 infra & accompanying text.
32 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969) (quoting opinion of Roberts, J. in Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)) ; see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941):
The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure
the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has
never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of
the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend.
33 See H. M. HART & H. WEcnsLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEm 317, 323 (1953).
14 See Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1773 (1967).
15 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965) (Cox I) ; see cases cited id. at 554.
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freedom of speech. Administrative officials may prohibit demonstra-
tions which they wrongly believe fail to meet regulatory mandates or
the regulatory procedure itself may interdict constitutionally protected
activity. This consideration has precipitated commentary and opinions
grappling with the concept of "prior restraint." 1 Perhaps the most
perplexing problems involved in the government's power to restrain
first amendment activity have been procedural: in whom should the
power vest and for how long may such restraints endure? The regu-
lations attacked in A Quaker Action Group impose a prior restraint
through the device of a permit system administered by an official em-
powered to deny a permit when in his opinion an application fails to
meet the pertinent regulatory requirements of size and manner1
While an administrative hearing is to proceed "with reasonable prompt-
ness" 18 with the judgment contoured by the "clear and present danger"
standard,' 9 the subtle and unassailable wielding of discretion may un-
duly suppress demonstrations in the name of an inflated conception of
the requirements of "public order."
The Supreme Court has articulated procedural requirements for
constitutional licensing schemes involving protected activity in Freed-
'man v. Maryland20 stating that "only a judicial determination in an
adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of
expression." 1 The Freedman Court held that a non-criminal movie
censorship system must require that a censor, "within a specified brief
period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the
film"; 2 2 that there be a prompt judicial hearing at which the censor has
the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression; 23 and
that there be a deadline for "final judicial decision." 2'4 This scheme
implies that, at least with film licensing, where the decision is likely to
16See, e.g., Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181
(1968); Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MiCH. L. REv. 1482 (1970);
Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTEmp. PROs. 648 (1955);
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 Hagv. L. REv. 518 (1970).
1735 Fed. Reg. 15393, 15394 (1970) (revised 36 C.F.R. §50.19(g)).
sId. (revised 36 C.F.R. § 50.19(f)).
'9 Id. (revised 36 C.F.R. § 50.19(f) (2)). The regulations probably require an
overly rigorous standard. The "clear and present danger" test has heretofore been
the rule of adjudication in "pure speech" cases. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1917). But "[m]ost first amendment cases . . .rest on a balancing of
the conflicting values and interests, whatever the Supreme Court calls the process."
Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 466 (1969).
The regulation of the form of communicative conduct should be governed by a less
stringent test than the regulation of the content of expression. See Comment, The
Constitutionality of a Requirement to Give Notice Before Marching, 118 U. PA. L.
REv. 270 (1969). The regulations, then, may produce the anomalous result of re-
quiring an administrative official to issue a permit in instances where a reviewing
court, using the less restrictive balancing process, would be constrained to deny one.
20 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
211d. at 58.
2
2
1d. at 59.
23Id. at 58-59.
24Id. at 59; see Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (failure of postal obscenity
regulation to require government to seek prompt judicial determination on issue of ob-
scenity renders regulation unconstitutional).
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-be total denial of a license rather than negotiation of time, place, and
manner conditions,-5 the administrator's decision cannot be "final" even
in the limited sense that it is binding unless the complainant seeks
judicial review, but a brief but absolute prohibition of all films is con-
stitutional. While arguments for the extension of Freedman's require-
ments to demonstration permits have been persuasively advanced,'
it is by no means clear that the Court will or should adopt such a
standard.
According an administrative denial temporary binding effect in a
system of prior restraint will rarely if ever greatly burden first amend-
ment freedoms in a film licensing case. Political expression is another
matter. The Supreme Court in Carroll v. President and Commis-
sioners of Princess Anne, holding unconstitutional an ex parte judicial
order enjoining a public meeting, observed:
It is vital to the operation of democratic government that the
citizens have facts and ideas on important issues before them.
A delay of even a day or two may be of crucial importance
in some instances.27
If constitutional standards in demonstration cases are indeed found to
require judicial determination before giving binding effect to an ad-
ministrative attempt to prohibit a demonstration, any system of
administrative prior restraint in this area may fail. Cases similar to
Carroll will undoubtedly arise. Any regulatory scheme specifying the
amount of time the administrator has to go to court to restrain a
demonstration will allow the administrator to thwart an urgent protest,
making his failure to approve final in the only relevant sense-an
intolerable result under Freedman's rationale. Thus, even if an ad-
ministrator has met procedural standards as strict as those imposed on
the judiciary in Carroll,"' he may find that Freedman disables him from
constitutionally restraining the demonstration because he cannot get
25 See Blasi, supra note 16, at 1541-42.
26See Blasi, supra note 16; Monaghan, supra note 16 ("Licensing, which func-
tionally has the impact of a specially tailored injunction with respect to the exercise
of a first amendment right, has felt the impact of the principles announced in
Freedman." Id. 539-40. "All the reasons which justify the result in Freedman apply
in the permit cases." Id. 541.); cf. Comment, Applying Freedman v. Maryland to
Campus Speaker Bans, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 512 (1971).
The Freedman Court felt that "a protracted and onerous course of litigation"
would deter both movie exhibitors, because of their limited financial stake in any one
picture, and distributors, because they could freely exhibit the film in most other
parts of the country, from seeking review. 380 U.S. at 59. Demonstrators typically
have no immediate financial goal in demonstrating against acts of government, and
the financial burden of prolonged judicial review could easily cause them to abandon
their claim after an adverse administrative decision. The attendant uncertainty of
litigation makes the effort even more unattractive. The expectation of swiftly ensuing
and impartial review, and imposition on the government of the burden of initiating
review and of proof, may ameliorate this.
27393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968) (quoting Harlan, J., dissenting in A Quantity of
Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 (1964)).
28 Id. at 185 (notice and adversary hearing before injunction).
1971]
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adequate judicial review prior to the time the demonstration is to take
place.
In Freedman the Court held that the censor's decision could be
given no final effect because his judgment is inherently defective or
insensitive to constitutional freedoms.2 9 If this reasoning leads to the
conclusion that in demonstration cases an administrator's decision can
have not even a temporary binding effect, the primary government
interest in an administrative prior restraint is destroyed."0 In a film
case the decision is simply whether to suppress, and time is not so
pressing as to foreclose an initial administrative decision. In a demon-
stration case, however, the decision is how to strike a balance, and
time may be critical. Yet administrative time, place, and manner re-
strictions will ease the burden on the judiciary and allow informal
resolution only if those desirous of demonstrating have some incentive
to reach an accommodation with the administrator."' When a demon-
stration is planned far in advance an accommodation may be more
carefully arranged, and if either party becomes intransigent the dispute
can be resolved by the judiciary within the framework of rules similar to
those enunciated in Freedman. When time is short and the adminis-
trator can prevent a demonstration for a fixed period of time by not
issuing a permit, prospective demonstrators wishing legal permission
to demonstrate during that period will be at the mercy of the adminis-
trator with respect to details of the time, place, and manner of the
demonstration. But if the administrator's denial of a permit lacks
even temporary binding effect, the demonstrators have no incentive to
work out a compromise because it costs them nothing simply to ignore
him.' Thus a permit system meeting the Freedman requirements and
in addition clothing the administrator's decision with no interim bind-
ing effect would be valueless to the government.
29 Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that
he may well be less responsive than a court . . . to the constitutionally pro-
tected interests in free expression.
380 U.S. at 57-58; see Emerson, supra note 16, at 657-59. The Court noted in Freed-
inan that the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the State Board of Censors' film dis-
approval in every reported case. 380 U.S. at 58 n.4. A propensity for improper
determination was also noted in A Quaker Action Group. 429 F2d at 187.
30 Because of the dangers perceived in giving any binding effect to an adminis-
trator's decision in such a situation, it has been contended that he should not have
power even to delay a demonstration while seeking review-a result clearly beyond
Freedman:
[I]f the burden to seek judicial validation of the permit denial is placed on
the city, that burden could be interpreted to mean that the city's failure to
achieve such validation by the time of the scheduled demonstration would
preclude a conviction for parading without a permit.
Blasi, supra note 16, at 1545.
31 See id. 1541-42.
32Athough Professor Monaghan suggests that a judicial hearing following an
administrative consideration meeting due process standards need not be de novo,
see Monaghan, supra note 16, at 524 n.23, the administrator is more accurately iden-
tified with the interests of the government as an adversary party rather than a
dispenser of justice. This point, of course, raises some doubt about the realism of
Professor Monaghan's suggestion.
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The Supreme Court appears sensitive to this problem. In Shuttles-
worth v. Birmingham " the Court overturned a local ordinance as
overly broad in conferring upon the City Commission "virtually un-
bridled and absolute power to prohibit any 'parade,' 'procession,' or
'demonstration' on the the city's streets or public ways." "' Without
ruling on the substantive validity of a narrow construction put on the
ordinance by the Alabama Supreme Court, the Court alternatively
found the statute as administered in the particular case unconstitu-
tional.," By assuming that the proper administrative approach was
required by Alabama law, the Court raised but avoided the Freedman
issue concerning the requirement of judicial review. Relegating it to a
footnote, the Court made judicial review merely one factor in the deter-
mination of the constitutionality of a regulatory scheme.36 Justice
Harlan, concurring, argued the applicability of Freedman's requirement
of expedited review of the administrator's decision but used apparently
ambiguous language concerning the need for judicial review.
37
The White House regulations challenged in A Quaker Action
Group, providing no time limits and no review of the park official,",
fail to meet any of the Freedman requirements. The regulations
promulgated after reversal of the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the government and reinstatement of the preliminary
injunction also make no provision for judicial review, but do contain
time limits requiring application for a permit only forty-eight hours
before a planned demonstration. 9 The regulations thus raise the
problems unanswered in Shuttlesworth concerning judicial review and
the interim binding effect of an administrative permit system. Absent
timely review, an administrator can obstruct any demonstration with
impunity. But an application of the Freedman standards requiring
judicial review where a demonstration's timeliness is a critical fact
or would emasculate the administrator's ability to control sched-
uled demonstrations and would render a refusal to act upon a permit
33394 U.S. 147 (1969).
34 Id. at 150 (footnote omitted).
3Id. at 159.
36 Id. at 155 n.4.
37 Freedman holds that if the State is to protect the public from obscene
movies, it must afford exhibitors a speedy administrative or judicial right of
review, lest "the victorious exhibitor might find the most propitious oppor-
tunity for exhibition [passed] .... The Freedman principle is applicable
here.
Id. at 162 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
I do not mean to suggest that a State or city may not reasonably require
that parade permit applications be submitted early enough to allow the
authorities and the judiciary to determine whether the parade proposal is
consistent with the important interests respecting the use of the streets which
local authority may legitimately protect.
Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
3836 C.F.R. § 50.19 (1970).
3935 Fed. Reg. 15393, 15394 (1970) (revised 36 C.F.R. §50.19(e)(1)). In
Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), an ex parte
temporary restraining order was held invalid, even though a full judicial hearing
could be obtained on the same 2 days' notice.
19711
674 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.119:668
application ineffectual. The best balance would be struck by giving
interim binding effect to the administrator's inaction or denial from
the time of application to the deadline for mandatory judicial review,
while allowing demonstrators a right to appeal directly to the courts
during that time to prompt an earlier consideration of a permit
application.
Unfortunately the federal courts have only contributed to the
confusion. Reviewing the district court's preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the regulations in A Quaker Action Group,
Chief Judge Bazelon responded to the government's claim that the court
was limited to determining whether the administratively struck balance
was "wholly irrational":
The expertise of those entrusted with the protection of the
President does not qualify them to resolve First Amendment
issues, the traditional province of the judiciary. A balancing
of First Amendment freedoms against the requirements of
Presidential safety may be left to other agencies in the first
instance. But absent a compelling showing-which has not
been begun here-that courts cannot evaluate the questions of
fact involved in estimating danger to the President, the final
judgment must rest with the courts. To enable the court to
reach a reasoned conclusion, it is incumbent upon any party
who would invoke Presidential safety . . . to provide the
court with the information necessary to an even-handed
decision.4'
This statement can be read as more than a mere refusal to accept
the "wholly irrational" standard of review urged by the government;
the language goes so far as to require that a "final" judgment be left
with the courts. If Judge Bazelon's statement enunciates the Freedman
definition of "final" and is conjoined with Freedman's requirements
for speedy hearing as elaborated by Justice Harlan's Shuttlesworth
concurrence, the administrator would never be empowered to restrain
a demonstration. The holding of the decision, however, belies such
a reading. The district court's preliminary injunction restraining ap-
plication of the regulations was modified to require fifteen days' notice
of a planned demonstration.4 While not a final decision on the merits,
this requirement has the same prohibitive effect as Freedman's "brief
period" and stands in stark contrast to the concern of the Supreme
Court for delay of a "day or two" in Carroll.' The evil worked by
the notice system is not merely the burden of providing reasonable
40 421 F.2d at 1118.
41 Id. at 1119.
42See text accompanying note 27 =pra; Blasi, supra note 16, at 1525 ("The
Supreme Court has never [explicitly] addressed the issue whether these advance-filing
requirements are consistent with the first amendment.").
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information 43 but rather the burden of waiting the required period if
the administrator chooses to demand it."' Thus, rather than curing the
procedural deficiencies in the regulations, the court of appeals may have
merely aggravated them.
The regulations promulgated for White House demonstrations are
undoubtedly defective on their face because they fail to provide any
mechanism for review of the administrator.' Further, neither the
preliminary injunction nor the regulations solve the problem of interim
binding effect pending review. Given the hesitancy of the Supreme
Court to clarify the problem, this difficulty is understandable, but never-
theless unacceptable. If prior restraints are to be permitted at all, an
operable administrative system for demonstrations must give the ad-
ministrator's inaction some finality, but only in the limited sense that
the burden of seeking judicial determination during a statutory "brief
period" rests upon the party desiring to engage in the regulated activity.
II. REGULATION OF CONDUCT AT THE WHITE HOUSE
Conduct expressive of rights protected by the first amendment can
be regulated in a manner incidentally limiting those freedoms
if [the governmental regulation] is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or sub-
4 3 The permit application should demand as much information as will be useful
for planning traffic control and scheduling the police force without inquiring into
the "content" of the proposed demonstration, striking a balance in those unavoidable
penumbral areas where conflicting interests cannot be easily segregated. Thus the
government ought to know what organization is promoting the event, how large the
group will be, what activities are planned, and when the group will assemble and
disperse. See Notice of Proposed Demonstration in Park Area(s), 35 Fed. Reg.
6600 (1970). On the other hand, some questions discourage exercise of the right
to demonstrate more than they enhance the government's interests. The government's
questionnaire in A Quaker Action Group asked for disclosure of the financial backing
of a proposed demonstration and of records of past conduct of officers of participating
organizations. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 2-4, Civil
No. 688-69 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1970). Requiring a financial statement may be simply
a subterfuge for gathering intelligence about anti-establishment citizens, and while
evidence of violent behavior and conviction records "can be highly relevant in predict-
ing the consequences of allowing a particular demonstration," the possibility of
"disguised censorship" is great. Blasi, supra note 16, at 1515.
"4See Monaghan, supra note 16, at 542 n.101 ("[I]t is doubtful that such a
lengthy notice will be tolerated generally.") ; cf. Robinson v. Coopwood, 292 F. Supp.
926 (N.D. Miss. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 415 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1969), discussed in
Comment, The Constitutionality of a Requirement to Give Notice Before Marching,
118 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 270 (1969).
45 See notes 38 & 39 supra. Without these protections the capital parks regula-
tions give park officials excessive latitude in granting and denying permits and the
scheme "lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement . . . against par-
ticular groups deemed to merit . . . displeasure, [and] results in a continuous and
pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion . . . " Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). See also A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, Civil No. 688-69
(D.D.C. Apr. 26, 1969) (order granting preliminary injunction) :
9. Since August 10, 1967, when the permit requirements were first
invoked for the White House sidewalk, those requirements have been adminis-
tered in an arbitrary, capricious and harassing manner which has had the
effect of impermissibly restricting the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment.
Id. at 2 (Conclusions of Law).
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stantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
46
Demonstrations, although protected by the first amendment, are
subject to greater incidental regulation than activity more closely
approximating "pure speech." I Generally, regulations which inci-
dentally restrict freedom of speech have been subjected to a balancing
test :
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of
public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, condi-
tional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts
is to determine which of these two conflicting interests de-
mands the greater protection under the particular circum-
stances presented.48
Neither side of the balance is necessarily black or white, however. The
governmental purposes involved might be accomplished through means
interfering less drastically with first amendment rights,49 and reasonable
alternative means for the expression of first amendment freedoms may
be available. 0
In areas traditionally open to the public,"' the governmental in-
terests normally involved are those of health, safety, and welfare-
which may be collectively called exercises of the police power. Those
cases permitting total bans in public areas, however, have involved
governmental interests more directly related to the harm arising from
the speech element of the conduct than to the harm to the exercise of
the police power arising from the nonspeech element. In Cox v.
Louisiana the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a state
statute prohibiting picketing near a courthouse with intent to impede
the administration of justice or influence a judge, juror, or witness6 2
46 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
47 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) (Cox I); Note, Regulation of
Demonstrations, 80 HARV. L. Rxv. 1773 (1967). The distinction between "pure speech"
and "speech plus" remains popular with the Supreme Court, see United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), but has been criticized for its artificiality, see Henlin,
Foreword: On Drawing Lines, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REv. 63,
76-82 (1968).
48 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950).
49 Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
50 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965) (Cox II) ; Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
61 Of course, in areas traditionally closed to the public, the government stands
on the same footing as a private landowner with regard to the exercise of first amend-
ment rights on such property. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
62379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965) (Cox II).
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The decision rested on the state interest in maintaining judicial im-
partiality.5 3 Frend v. United States " upheld as an implementation of
foreign policy a statutory condemnation of picketing within 500 feet of
an embassy." Though neither of these cases pointed directly to a
clause of the Constitution empowering the government to silence first
amendment rights in the area concerned, both found exclusion a neces-
sary corollary of constitutional purposes other than the police power
of the State and, in Frend, the plenary power of Congress in the Dis-
trict of Columbia."'
The identification of particular governmental interests supporting
limitation of the exercise of speech has not been seriously undertaken,57
and inquiry in first amendment cases has focused instead on the means
the government may use to carry out admittedly legitimate purposes. 8
There is undoubted federal power to regulate conduct involving free
speech elements in the area of the White House in exercise of the
police power in the District of Columbia, but this area has traditionally
been open to the public,;9 and the power to prohibit demonstrations
must arise from the time, place, and manner of the conduct rather than
the exercise of the right of free speech itself. The test set forth above 6
suggests that, in the absence of a particular legitimate interest in
silencing all dissent in the area, the government may not completely
prohibit the right.
The problem may be more difficult, however, because additional
constitutional considerations come into play on both sides of the balance
once the White House is involved. Since Osborn v. Bank of the United
States "' the Supreme Court has recognized the right of government to
protect its officers in the line of duty as an inherent right of government,
even in the absence of congressional legislation. Since that time Con-
gress has made it a federal crime to murder ' or threaten the life of the
President.3 The right to protect federal officers, particularly the Presi-
dent, ought to be given weight in any attempt to evaluate the means the
government has chosen to regulate demonstrations at the White House
and in striking a balance between the interests involved. While plenary
power may exist to further any particular legitimate purpose of govern-
53 Id. at 565.
64 100 F2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 640 (1939).
55 Id. at 692-93.
56 Id. at 693.
57 Henldn, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82
HAiv. L. REv. 63, 76-82 (1968).
68 See Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YArE L.J. 464,
466 n.13 (1969).
59 See, e.g., Scott v. District of Columbia, 184 A.2d 849, 851 (D.C. Ct. App.
1962).
60 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
6122 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880),
citing Osborn for this proposition.
6218 U.S.C. § 1751 (a) (Supp. V, 1970).
6318 U.S.C. § 871 (a) (1964) ; see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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ment,' the availability of less drastic means will hinge on the particular
legitimate purposes involved.
Inquiry into constitutional mandates cannot end with the govern-
mental interests. The life of the President is important to the federal
government at least in part because great discretion is vested in him to
determine the directions of public policy. Because he has this discretion
he ought not be immune from the influence of the people.
One of the least treated clauses of the first amendment provides
that "Congress shall make no law . . .abridging . . . the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." ' In those cases where the clause has been
discussed it has been either merely appended to the right of freedom
of speech," or, in at least one case, used in place of later broad ap-
plication of other clauses. 7  It is nevertheless true that the right,
as Chief Judge Bazelon has said, "is unquestionable: the First Amend-
ment so provides, in precisely as many words." " The legislative and
executive branches of government stand in a far different relationship to
the people than the judiciary in this regard, as the Supreme Court has
implicitly assumed:
A State may adopt safeguards necessary and appropriate to
assure that the administration of justice at all stages is free
from outside control and influence.69
The scope of the rights to assemble and petition has never been
defined. The Court has touched on the subject and implied somewhat
casually that they are not separate and distinct:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose
of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for
any thing else connected with the powers or duties of the
national government, is an attribute of national citizenship,
6 4 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819): "Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate . . . are constitutional." Id. at 421.
65 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) ; Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965) (Cox I).
17 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867); see, e.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1969).
68 Jeanette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of the Capitol Police, 421 F.2d 1090, 1105
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, C.J., reaching the merits after dissenting from the court's
remand to a 3-judge court). In the Quaker Action Group case itself, he was even
more direct in applying the guarantee where the action was directed at the executive:
"'The right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances' is so basic to our society that any deprivation might well be
found to constitute irreparable injury" 421 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (foot-
note omitted).
69 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965) (Cox II) ; see Virginia Declaration
of Rights § 5 (1776), in R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RiGHTS, 1776-1791,
at 231-32 (1955), stating that there must be a clear distinction between the judiciary
and the other two branches, the latter two being kept from oppressive action "by
feeling and participating the burthens of the people ... .
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and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the
United States.7°
The passage speaks directly to the Congress as the target of peaceful
group petitioning, but the Executive branch may legitimately be con-
sidered to be subsumed in the category of "anything else connected with
the powers or duties of the national government." Certain pertinent
observations concerning the structure and function of the federal
government support this view. Congress, empowered by the Constitu-
tion to make laws necessary and proper for carrying out all powers
granted to federal government by that instrument, has delegated broad
discretion to the President, charged with the constitutional duty to
execute those laws. This discretion is often exercised in response to
rapidly changing situations 71 and during those times when Congress is
not in session.72 In such cases the only effective plea is one addressed
to the Executive, since he alone has effective control of the powers and
duties of the national government. In addition; the President is granted
a range of powers under article II of the Constitution in which his de-
cisions are reviewable by no one but the electorate every fourth year.7"
If, then, the right to assemble and petition "the Government" is to com-
pass the full range of federal discretionary power, the right, to be effec-
tive, must include the right to assemble and petition the President.
This, of course, does not begin to define the limits of the right, but it
does suggest that it may be beyond the power of the Executive to seek
complete isolation from the people. Whether the right to assemble and
petition carries with it the right to go to the seat of government, and
whether the seat of government means only the District of Columbia or
a particular place within it, are issues about which one can only spec-
ulate. Insofar as the right is one of effective assembly and petition, it
might be argued that modern means of communication negate the
concept of geographical proximity as a necessary element of the power
to petition the government.
In response to such a position, however, there are considerations
suggesting that protection of the right to assemble and petition the
Executive ought to raise a strong presumption against governmental
regulation which relegates demonstrators seeking to influence executive
policy to an alternative site removed from the proximity of the Executive
Mansion. Since the White House stands as a symbol of the Presidency,
the government is particularly sensitive to protest there. It is precisely
this symbolism that attracts demonstrators in their efforts to influence
70 United States v. Cruiksbank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (emphasis added).
71 See the discussion of the naval blockade of the Confederate coast in Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
72 The Constitution also gives the President additional powers when Congress
is not in session. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
73 See U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
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executive policy. Petitioning is more effective when done before the
public, and the act of petitioning before the seat of the Executive is
particularly effective in enlisting support when the entreaty is directed
at the Executive, and that fact is symbolically obvious. Because the
right to assemble and petition depends upon this consideration more
than does the more general right to free speech, denial of that forum
abridges the former right more than the latter.
The resolution of the conflicting interests calls for a balancing of
asserted justifications on both sides of the dispute. An accommodation
must be reached in every instance where the orderly processes of govern-
ment and first amendment exercises are at seeming loggerheads. In
order to meet constitutional standards the required balance must finally
be resolved on an ad hoc basis, and guidelines should be established only
with regard to the most recurrent and standardized conditions incident
to any such conflict."4
The 100/500 limitation violates this principle. Such a regulation
prejudges a demonstration,"* instituting a presumption of constitutional
prohibition before the participants have even drawn near to the seat of
government. This prejudgment should void the regulation for uncon-
stitutional overbreadth " because it embodies a judgment which no one
is capable of making, especially where the facilities will accommodate
many times the prescribed number of demonstrators.
77
There must be a compelling showing that an administratively im-
posed limit is required; it was precisely the lack of such proof that led
the court of appeals to reject the government's contentions."' Proof is
necessary in order to enable the court to "reach a reasoned conclu-
sion"" about application of the balancing standard. In order for the
court to sanction this blanket limitation, it is incumbent upon the proper
government agencies to show that such an insensitive stricture is
justified. Any other "first instance" prohibition should be invalid."
If, as this Comment has contended, the legislative and executive
branches stand on the same footing with regard to popular petitioning,
a case involving petitioning of the legislative branch is instructive. In
Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of the Capitol Police 81 a federal
statute I prohibiting demonstrations on the Capitol grounds was found
to raise a substantial constitutional question. To avoid unconstitu-
tional overbreadth, the same statute was subsequently construed to
reach only conduct "which interferes with the orderly processes of the
74 See text accompanying note 48 supra.
75 A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1111, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
70 Cf. Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of the Capitol Police, 421 F.2d 1090,
1110 (1969) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
77A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1111, 1116 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
("At various times as many as 6,000 people have demonstrated on the sidewalk, and
as many as 30,000 in Lafayette Park.").
78Id. at 1118.
7Id.
80 Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
81421 F.2d 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
8240 U.S.C. § 193g (1964).
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Congress, or with the safety of individual legislators, staff members,
visitors, or tourists, or their right to be free from intimidation, undue
pressure, noise or inconvenience." 11 The Capitol grounds and building,
regarded by the Rankin court as "the very seat" of the legislature,"' are
a symbolic and practical focal point for petitioning, the place which
all those with grievances are entitled to approach to seek a hearing.'
These cases demonstrate the different, and less substantial, nature of
a permissible governmental restriction on access to the legislative and,
presumably, executive branches. The courthouse8 6 and embassy8 7
cases reflected essentially distinguishable aspects of the problem-
judicial insularity and foreign relations. Those considerations are not
properly admitted to the balance in A Quaker Action Group. The
legislative and executive branches by their very nature stand as the
institutions toward which first amendment activity is directed.
The governmental interests to be considered in A Quaker Action
Group involve both normal exercises of the police power and the unique
concern of Presidential safety. Disruption of vehicular and pedestrian
traffic,"8 the threat to the foliage of Lafayette Park, 9 and the disturbing
consequences of a demonstration to the peaceful repose of that retreat
are of the former type and may quickly be disposed of in the balance.
Rush hour events can be curtailed wholly or in part, and damage bonds
required to assure replacement of damaged shrubs. Peace and quiet
are nonexistent to begin with."0 The only substantial consideration
advanced by the government is the safety of the President.
The safety of the nation's Chief Executive is decidedly crucial to
the national security, governmental interest, and national well-being. At
present he is hardly unprotected and could be seriously threatened only
by a rancorous demonstration of extraordinary size.91 The White
8 3 United States v. Nicholson, 263 A.2d 56, 57 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970).
84 421 F.2d at 1093 n.3.
85 Cf. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
86 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (Cox II). "Since courts, unlike legis-
latures or the executive, traditionally are not expected to act with an eye to public
opinion, this part of the [Louisiana anti-picketing] statute, appropriate where a court
was concerned, would hardly be permissible where the legislature or the executive
branch is concerned." A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1111, 1117 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
87 Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
38 Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965) (Cox I); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
89 See 35 Fed. Reg. 11489-90 (1970).
90 See Washington Free Community, Inc. v. Wilson, 426 F.2d 1213, 1218 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Lafayette Park
"tumultuous").
91 Circuit judge MacKinnon and District Judge Hart relied heavily on the finding
of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence that political
violence is increasing and that assassinations are more common in America than
elsewhere in the world. 429 F.2d at 188-93 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) ; Civil No.
688-69 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 1969), discussed in 35 Fed. Reg. 11488 (1970). The report,
however, merely states that political violence is dangerous to public officials because
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House is encircled by a tall steel fence and 230 feet of open lawn;
numerous guards, including the Secret Service, are assigned to the
building and its environs. According to the Director of the Secret
Service, even with presently available precautions, if a mob were to
surge toward the White House the safety of the President could be
ensured only by being prepared to inflict casualties on the attackers. 2
But rather than rely on an uncorroborated conclusion advanced by an
interested government official, the suggestion that the fence be
strengthened or improved should be considered.93  Balancing "the
state's interest in the added effectiveness of the chosen means against
the individual interest in the use of less drastic ones," " the govern-
ment should employ alternative means less burdensome on freedom of
speech, petition and assembly. In any event, simple assertions and
untested hypotheses are no substitute for demonstrated requirements
of Presidential safety.
CONCLUSION
A Quaker Action Group presents a variation on the familiar theme
of opposing claims of first amendment rights and legitimate govern-
ment purposes. This conflict should be resolved through a procedural
arrangement which leaves effective prohibition of demonstrations to
judicial determination without disabling the government from attempt-
ing a less formal resolution of time, place, and manner, satisfactory to
all concerned. This may be accomplished if an administrator's refusal
immediately to grant a permit is binding, but only in the sense that
the burden of seeking judicial review is shifted for a specified brief
period of time to the party asserting the right. If neither party is
willing to yield to the other's claims, resort to judicial determination
may be had; yet a realistic weighting of the need for maintenance of
order is achieved by shifting the burden of seeking accelerated deter-
mination to the party asserting the necessity of extraordinary urgency.
Such a resolution recognizes the actual interests of both parties by
making an informal adjustment mutually advantageous.
it can incite deranged individuals to attempt assassinations. The Commission noted
that:
no presidential assassination, with the exception of an abortive attempt on
the life of President Truman, has been demonstrated to have sprung from
a decision of an organized group whose goal was to change the policy or
the structure of the United States government.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, To ESTABLISH
JUSTICE, To INSURE DossTic TRANQUILITY 122 (off. ed. 1969).
92 Supplemental Affidavit of Director, U.S. Secret Service, quoted in 35 Fed.
Reg. 11487 (1970).
9 3 A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 F2d 1111, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The government claimed that such alternative means were "not feasible." 35 Fed.
Reg. 11487 (1970).
9 Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Anenrdinent, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 468
(1969) ; cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-08 (1963) ; Blasi, supra note 16,
at 1497.
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Given an adequate procedure for regulation of White House
demonstrations, a regulatory scheme which provides absolute numerical
limits ought not be applied unless empirically proven necessary for
all groups. Moreover, in striking an appropriate balance for any par-
ticular demonstration, the important and fundamental nature of the
Executive as a policymaker in the constitutional framework must be
acknowledged. To deny to those desirous of demonstrating before the
White House the fullest latitude in the use of that forum is to sub-
stantially abridge the exercise of first amendment freedoms and every
attempt to protect the President by noninterfering means should first
be required.
